Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Understanding Recent Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe
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A number of European governments have pronounced multiculturalism a failure and opted for more aggressive means of integrating immigrants into their societies. This paper asks what we are to make of this trend: does it reflect deeply rooted illiberal prejudice or a novel shift in liberal-democratic states’ approaches to nation-building? I suggest that aggressive integrationism is reflective of a distinctly ‘Schmittian’ liberalism, which aims to clarify the core values of liberal societies and use coercive state power to protect them from illiberal and putatively dangerous groups. In contrast to liberal multiculturalists, who counsel accommodation, compromise and negotiation among majority and minority groups, Schmittian liberals see the task of immigrant integration as part of a broader campaign to preserve ‘Western civilisation’ from illiberal threats. Their framing of the problem in existentialist terms allows them to justify policies that might otherwise be seen to contravene liberal principles of toleration and equality. As such, Schmittian liberalism complicates our understanding of liberal states’ approaches to immigration and immigrant integration policies.

Keywords: Immigrants; Integration Policy; Liberalism; Multiculturalism; Carl Schmitt

Beginning well before the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London and accelerating as a result of these and other events (including the murder of Dutch artist Theo Van Gogh and the Danish ‘cartoon controversy’), several European governments have pronounced multiculturalism to be a ‘failure’ and opted for more aggressive means of integrating immigrants into their societies (Burns 2011; Doomernik 2005; Fekete 2006; Joppke 2004, 2007; Michalowski 2007; Tebble 2006; Weaver 2010). The policy instruments selected to pursue this end have included
mandatory integration courses, aimed at facilitating language acquisition and inculcating values, and citizenship tests similarly formulated with an eye to determining whether or not individuals have internalised prevailing norms (Corbett 2006; Etzioni 2007; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Joppke 2008). The Netherlands has gone so far as to demand that would-be immigrants pass an integration test before setting foot in the country, effectively making integration a condition for admission rather than of legal residency and citizenship, as has long been the norm (De Heer 2004; Doomernik 2005; Joppke 2007). Several European countries have also introduced legislation constraining individuals’ ability to wear certain religious attire, such as the burqa and hijab, in the name of upholding women’s rights and minimising the presence of religion in the public sphere (Beck-Gernsheim 2004; Freeman 2004; Weil 2004). Moves have also been made to restrict arranged marriages and prohibit other minority religious practices (Phillips and Dustin 2004; Phillips and Saharso 2008; Razack 2008).

These initiatives have often been accompanied by a sharply antagonistic discourse designating putatively clear and inviolable boundaries of liberal-democratic conduct. Although academics, journalists and aspirant public intellectuals have taken the lead in crafting this discourse, it is also featured in the statements and programmes of mainstream political parties and politicians. The message advanced is relatively straightforward: immigrants who willingly opt for inclusion are to be accepted, on the condition that they successfully demonstrate that they have internalised prevailing ‘values’ (Blair 2006). Conversely, immigrants judged to have rejected liberal-democratic norms, through their deeds and/or speech, are to be excluded through the revocation of their rights to citizenship and legal residency and, in extreme cases, their detention, denaturalisation and deportation. ¹

This move to an aggressive ‘civic integrationism’ has reached beyond Europe. In January 2007, the town of Hérouxville in northern Quebec passed a ‘statement of principles’ for would-be immigrants, informing newcomers that its residents ‘listen to music . . . drink alcoholic beverages . . . dance and decorate a tree with balls and some lights at the end of every year’. The authors of the statement also took the opportunity to warn immigrants that ‘the killing of women [through] public beatings or burning them alive’ went against the town’s ‘standards’ (Municipalité Hérouxville 2007). The Hérouxville charter sparked an ongoing debate in Quebec over the degree to which the province should reasonably accommodate immigrant minorities. ² In October 2007, the opposition Parti Québécois entered headlong into the debate, introducing a bill that would require that immigrants demonstrate an adequate command of French in order to ‘hold public office, raise funds for a party or petition the National Assembly with a grievance’. Not to be outdone, the governing Liberal Party tabled a bill in March 2010 that would effectively prevent women wearing the burqa from accessing public services. ³

The turn to civic integrationism across a range of liberal-democratic countries encourages us to reconsider long-standing assumptions in the field of immigration and citizenship studies, the most relevant of which, in this paper, concerns the role of
the ‘liberal state’ in shaping immigration and integration policies. The notion that
liberal-democratic states encourage relatively open immigration policies and ‘civic’
citizenship regimes has become axiomatic in the literature on immigration and
citizenship politics and policy-making (DeLaet 2000; Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992;
Joppke 2001). According to James Hollifield, ‘a principal factor that has sustained
international migration…is the accretion of rights for foreigners in the liberal
democracies [through] the rise of “rights-based liberalism”’ (Hollifield 2000: 148;
1992). In a similar vein, Gary Freeman (1995) claims that there is ‘an expansionary
bias in the politics of immigration in liberal democracies’, which is reinforced by
‘a strong anti-populist norm that dictates that politicians should not seek to exploit
racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes’. When combined
with the dynamics of client politics, this ‘constrained discourse’ has resulted in
immigration policies that ‘tend to be more liberal than public opinion’ (Freeman
range of liberal-democratic states would appear to contradict these arguments. We
are left to wonder why liberal-democratic states have opted to introduce what might
reasonably be deemed illiberal policies in the sphere of immigrant integration policy.

I explore this question in three steps. I begin by situating the turn to civic
integrationism temporally, noting the influence of key events and processes. I then
survey other scholars’ efforts to describe and explain the trend. Despite important
differences in their arguments, all agree that the new integrationism has been driven
by political coalitions that include self-described liberals and progressives. Building
on this work, I suggest that aggressive integrationism is reflective of a distinctly
‘Schmittian’ liberalism, which aims to clarify the core values of liberal societies and
use coercive state power to protect them from illiberal and putatively dangerous
groups. As such it is not simply a new brand of old-style xenophobia, but rather a
self-consciously liberal response to the challenges of cultural pluralisation that seeks
to distinguish itself from its primary competitor, liberal multiculturalism. Schmittian
liberals reject liberal multiculturalism because it counsels negotiation, compromise
and a willingness to accommodate groups whose religious beliefs and cultural
practices may diverge from those of the majority (Carens 2000; Kymlicka 1995;
Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Modood 2007; Parekh 2002).4 In contrast to liberal
multiculturalists, Schmittian liberals see the task of immigrant integration as part of a
broader campaign to preserve ‘Western civilisation’ from illiberal threats, particularly
those based on ‘fundamentalist Islam’. Their framing of the problem in existentialist
terms allows advocates of aggressive integrationism to justify policies that might
otherwise be seen to contravene liberal principles of toleration and equality. As such,
Schmittian liberalism complicates our understanding of liberal states’ approaches to
immigration and immigrant integration policies.

I conclude by considering the validity of Schmittian liberal positions, arguing that
ostensibly liberal arguments on behalf of illiberal means cannot be used as a cover for
policies whose intention is exclusion. We are warranted in looking at both the nature
of the message and at the messenger in considering the validity of such claims.
The normative justifiability of weakly defended messages from actors with well-known anti-immigrant credentials should be greeted with suspicion. Conversely, measures advanced on behalf of genuinely held liberal principles—such as the protection of gender equality or freedom of speech—should not be reduced to simple evocations of racism. At the very least, opponents of such policies must recognise that they are at times put forward on behalf of justifiably liberal ends by actors with impeccable progressive credentials.

I suggest that opposition to such policies might be better served by shifting from normative to pragmatic critique. Regardless of the intentions of its advocates, the turn to a more aggressive liberalism is likely to exacerbate the very problems it seeks to solve; Schmittian liberals’ insistence on clarity, decisiveness and action, as against negotiation, patience and compromise, is likely to deepen rifts between groups, intensifying ill-will and cutting off possibilities for dialogue. The premium which Schmittian liberalism places on societal homogeneity—even if it is genuinely based on liberal values as opposed to race or ethnicity—makes it a poor instrument for encouraging integration. While it may result in superficial compliance driven by a fear of negative consequences, it is not likely to achieve the deep changes in psyche it so desperately craves. Seen in this light, Schmittian liberalism is a poor substitute for liberal multiculturalism if the aim of immigrant integration policy is to sustain stable liberal-democratic communities.

**Situating the New Integrationism**

Some claim that there is nothing new about European states’ turn to more aggressive integration policies, arguing that it reflects age-old racist mindsets that have long structured Europeans’ interactions with migrants. In this view, Europeans are simply acting consistently; while the language of exclusion has changed, its intended result—the exclusion of racialised groups—has not.

While there is no gainsaying the enduringly pernicious presence of racism in Europe, this position has difficulty accounting for the nature and timing of recent trends in immigration and integration policy. It also downplays the importance of more inclusionary trends that preceded the new integrationism and continue to exert an influence on policy-making. These trends include the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation across Europe (Bleich 2003; Joppke 2007); the liberalisation of citizenship laws, even in traditionally restrictive countries such as Germany (Howard 2009; Ingram and Triadafilopoulos 2010; Triadafilopoulos 2006; Weil 2001); and the growing awareness among European leaders that immigration will be required to help meet looming labour market needs arising out of shrinking working-age populations. Thus the new integrationism is nested within a broader liberalising trend that has been unfolding since the end of World War II (Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1999; Soysal 1994; Triadafilopoulos 2006).

Arguably, this broadly inclusionary tendency is one of the factors driving the new integrationism. As European states have begun to grapple with the reality of
immigration-induced pluralisation, debates over how best to manage this shift have sharpened. These debates no longer revolve around whether to include immigrants, but rather over how integration ought to be pursued (Faist and Triadafilopoulos 2006). With the exception of the Extreme Right, all European political actors believe that settled immigrant populations must be integrated into European societies. As Gerdes et al. (2007) have noted, European political elites ‘are all civic republicans now’, albeit republicans with differing and often incommensurable ideas as to how integration should be conceived and enacted. The woeful job that many European states have done in managing immigrant integration to date has made debates over how to best achieve integration all the more urgent (Joppke 2007).

These debates have been patterned by a number of important events and processes, including the disintegration of the post-WWII political-economic order; the transformation of the European security context as a result of the end of the Cold War and onset of the ‘war on terror’; the expansion of the EU; and, somewhat paradoxically, liberal-democratic states’ rejection of the explicitly racist policies and mindsets that were common in the pre-WWII era. I briefly touch on each of these points below.

The end of the postwar economic ‘Golden Age’ in the mid-1970s inaugurated a long period during which many European states have struggled to maintain relatively generous welfare states while addressing the challenges of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment. The move away from Fordist production strategies in the postwar period hit immigrants particularly hard, as many had been recruited through so-called guestworker schemes to work in the manufacturing sector (Castles 1986; Kindleberger 1967; Zaslove 2003; Zolberg 1992). Foreign workers were among the first to be ‘downsized’ when European firms began to scale back their operations to compete in the ‘new global economy’. Moreover, the tightening of labour markets as a result of economic stagnation led many European states to implement restrictions on immigrants’ labour market participation, including policies that made it extremely difficult for spouses and youth who had arrived through family reunification policies to find work (Castles 1985; Erdem and Mattes 2003; O’Brien 1988). Thus immigrants have borne the brunt of Europe’s ongoing economic restructuring. Despite this, their disproportionate share in the unemployment figures has led many critics to accuse them of taking unfair advantage of social welfare policies meant for ‘natives’.

Extreme-right-wing populist parties have been particularly effective in exploiting welfare chauvinism as a means of mobilising political support (Berezin 2009; Betz 2003; Zaslove 2008).

The disintegration of the postwar economic order had related political effects. Perhaps most importantly, fairly stable party systems fragmented as traditional parties of the mainstream Left and Right were challenged by ‘new parties’, including environmentalist Greens and extreme-right-wing populists (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005). The emergence of these new parties destabilised long-standing cross-party consensus on immigration and integration policy, further politicising these policy areas (Angenendt 2003; Minkenberg 2001; Perlmutter 1996, 2002;
Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006). The new parties also shifted the terms of immigration and integration debates, bringing identity concerns to the forefront—both by advocating the introduction of multiculturalism (as was the case with the German Greens) or promising to halt immigration and repatriate ‘foreigners’ by force if necessary (as per the French Front National). Arguably, the growing presence of these new political parties has pressured more mainstream rivals to shift their platforms and tactics to protect their flanks. This has led to an intensification of debates over immigration and integration policy-making in Europe.

This change in party systems and shift in political language and tactics coincided with the end of the Cold War and the consequent reappraisal of European security policies. Europe has moved away from traditional security concerns toward a greater preoccupation with non-state actors, international migration and terrorism (Adamson 2006; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 1995, 2000; Rudolph 2003). The dominant threat in the post-Cold War era is not a global thermonuclear catastrophe ignited by war between the rival great powers, but ‘asymmetrical’ attacks launched by relatively small groups whose adherence to fundamentalist ideologies leaves them willing to take their own lives in order to inflict maximal damage on ‘decadent’ European publics. The securitisation of European states’ migration policies in the light of such threats began well before the terror attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London, but was intensified as a result of these events, as evidenced by the passage of new security legislation across Europe (Brouwer 2003; Faist 2005). The growing fear of so-called ‘homegrown terrorists’ has also driven the linkage of security and immigrant integration policies. The terrorist threat is increasingly connected not only to malevolent outsiders, but also to disaffected groups and individuals inside European states (Leiken 2005).

The fact that the terrorist threat has mapped onto religious differences is crucially important. For many, the attacks perpetrated by groups influenced by Al Qaeda demonstrated the validity of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis (Huntington 1993, 1996). Indeed, Huntington’s argument was given new life in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as it provided some with a ready-made framework for making sense of these disturbing events (Turner 2002). European intellectuals and commentators have taken the liberty of adapting Huntington’s framework, typically treating Europe as a contested continent wherein the forces of ‘Western civilisation’ are locked in a struggle to the death with fundamentalists bent on eradicating hard-won freedoms (Bawer 2007; Phillips 2006; Steyn 2006; Ye’or 2005). In such a struggle, tolerance and respect for religious difference are considered weaknesses that may be exploited by the enemy; consequently, these authors argue that those interested in preserving their civilisation must act decisively and not be overly concerned with appearances.

The intensification of this civilisational self-identification has also been driven by the eastward expansion of the EU. For many, the prospect of Turkey’s entry into the EU represents not only a formidable governance challenge but, more importantly, a disturbing threat to European identity (Göle 2005). Critics cast it as an illiberal
presence threatening the cohesion of an enlightened, liberal Europe. Again, the existential nature of the threat has tended to weaken the force of prudential arguments in favour of Turkey’s accession. According to opponents of Turkish membership, Europe must stand for something and draw its limits somewhere, lest it cease to form a distinct political entity (Schmidt 2000; Sciolino 2002).

These civilisational limits are typically cast in political-ideological, rather than ethno-cultural or ‘racial’, terms. This is in keeping with prevailing discursive standards; the Nazis effectively discredited older notions of civilisational superiority based on biological difference (Barkan 1992; Cairns 1999; Fredrickson 2003; Kymlicka 2007). The demise of scientific racism and the steady weakening of extreme nationalism among liberal-democratic countries in the postwar period have meant that boundary maintenance both within and among states is increasingly cast in terms of value compatibility; that is, similarity and difference are measured with reference to ‘principles’ rather than to biological descent. Hence, immigrants who express fundamentalist values are said to stand outside of the liberal-democratic community by virtue of their beliefs and practices, just as Turkey is said to stand outside of Europe because of its failure to internalise human rights standards and other characteristics of contemporary Western statehood. The fact that such boundary maintenance is conducted through the language of values does not diminish its exclusionary effects. Homogeneity can be based on ideological criteria just as easily as other markers (Stolcke 1999). 5

Theorising the New Integrationism

Scholars working in the area of immigration and citizenship politics and policymaking have been slow to grasp this point. Much of the literature in this area has relied on a static notion of liberal norms, which have long been held to be the force driving greater openness in states’ immigration and citizenship policies. Where it persisted, exclusion was deemed a consequence of vestigial ethnic nationalism, illiberal regimes and/or the political influence of extreme-right-wing parties (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Joppke 1999; Minkenberg 2001). An unstated assumption underlying the liberal state thesis was that liberal states would eventually eschew exclusion and forcible assimilation and opt instead for liberal multicultural modes of immigrant integration. Will Kymlicka gave voice to this view in the late 1990s, holding that liberal multiculturalism had become the dominant position of the day. According to Kymlicka, integration debates increasingly turned not on whether to accept liberal multiculturalists’ calls for group-differentiated rights, but on ‘how to develop and refine’ them to fit in particular contexts (Kymlicka 1998: 148, emphasis added). 6

The emergence of aggressive civic integrationism across a range of liberal-democratic countries makes clear that such a consensus on liberal multiculturalism no longer holds (if it ever did). The defence of hardline policies toward immigrants through reference to liberal ends such as the maintenance of gender equality has
compelled scholars to reconsider the relationship between liberalism and inclusion/exclusion. I survey some recent work on this subject below.

**Fekete: Enlightened Fundamentalism**

Liz Fekete links the emergence of aggressive integrationism with the mainstreaming of hitherto radical anti-immigrant views. The meshing of security concerns and immigration and citizenship policy-making in the aftermath of 9/11 has allowed extremist positions to become part of the ‘normal’ policy agenda. Most importantly, this process has also featured a novel shift in political coalitions, as extreme-right-wing policy prescriptions on immigration and citizenship have come to be supported not only by more-centrist conservative parties, but also by liberals, social democrats and, ‘most alarmingly, even some feminists and gay activists’ (Fekete 2006: 2).

Fekete convincingly demonstrates that the most severe integrationist measures have been driven by governmental coalitions that include extreme-right-wing parties. In Denmark, the Liberal Party allied itself not only with the Conservative People’s Party but also with ‘the openly Islamophobic Danish People’s Party (DFP)’ (2006: 3). Fekete indicates that the presence of the DFP in the governing coalition helps to explain Denmark’s turn to a more aggressive integrationism. In the area of citizenship law, Denmark now demands that immigrants wishing to naturalise swear an oath ‘to work actively for the integration of myself and my family into Danish society’ (2006: 3). The Ministry of Integration’s website also states that those who wish to become citizens must be prepared to ‘work, pay taxes, [not] hit [their] children and show respect for equal rights between the sexes’ (2006: 3). The DFP has also sponsored a bill

[T]o make it easier for social workers to place immigrant children whose parents ‘forbid them to integrate into Danish society’ into foster care because the child’s ‘best interests are not being served by raising them to be hostile to Danish society’. The system must step in and remove these children, so that they can be raised ‘according to democratic values’ (Fekete 2006: 3).

Similarly, Fekete claims that the shift toward aggressive integrationism in the Netherlands was spurred by the political success of the late Pim Fortuyn. According to her, liberal and conservative politicians hardened their approaches to immigration when the party Fortuyn founded before his death enjoyed a stunning breakthrough in the 2002 general election. The November 2004 slaying of artist and film-maker Theo Van Gogh at the hands of the Dutch-born Mohammed Bouyeri further entrenched anti-immigrant and Islamophobic tendencies among mainstream Dutch politicians, to the extent that the Liberal Party (VVD) ‘internalized xenophobia’ (2006: 4). For Fekete, this hardening of positions among centre-right parties in the Netherlands helps to explain the passage of the ‘harshest and most demanding’ integration policies in Europe (2006: 4).
While Fekete effectively demonstrates the influence of anti-immigrant political parties and politicians on the policy-making process, her attempt to make sense of progressive actors’ support for aggressive integrationist measures is less convincing. For instance, she simply rejects political philosopher Susan Moller Okin’s questioning of multiculturalism’s compatibility with feminism, accusing her of ‘misrepresenting multiculturalism’ and legitimating ‘an academic discourse... pitting women’s rights against immigrant rights’ (Fekete 2006: 13). Not only has this allowed ‘white western feminists to make sweeping claims about the incompatibility of non-western cultures with the western liberal tradition’ but, more alarmingly, it has also served as fodder for extreme-right-wing parties keen on exploiting ‘issues of domestic violence in immigrant communities’ for their own narrow political interests (2006: 13). Fekete effectively reduces feminists who speak out against honour killings and forced marriages to ‘cheerleaders’ for a ‘monocultural society’ and ‘servants of the cultural fundamentalist cause’, implying that anything less than strong support for multiculturalism is illiberal by definition.

Hence, despite the title of Fekete’s article, there can be no ‘enlightened’ fundamentalism. Wittingly or not, liberal feminists who question the compatibility of multiculturalism and gender equality are advancing a xenophobic right-wing agenda. In short, there is no puzzle to ponder: aggressive integrationism is simply a new twist on old-fashioned racism, furthered by the uninformed or purposefully malicious collaboration of liberals.

**Joppke: Civic Integrationism**

Christian Joppke rejects this position, arguing that ‘It would be misleading to interpret civic integration toward immigrants as a rebirth of nationalism or racism’ (2007: 14). This is because the new integrationism aims to extend and reinforce the homogeneity of liberal, and not racially or nationally defined, communities (Joppke 2004: 249; 2007). Immigrants are not excluded because of their ‘race’, and integration is into a set of liberal political values, rather than national cultures (thus distinguishing the new integrationism from older modes of forced assimilation). The most important distinguishing feature of the new integrationism is its insistence that immigrants be compelled to adopt liberal orientations (Joppke 2004: 248; 2007: 14). Thus it stands as a rejection of more-laissez faire approaches and liberal multiculturalism: ‘With its new stress on civic integration... the liberal state is becoming more assertive about its liberal principles, and shows itself less willing to see them violated under the cloak of “multicultural toleration”’ (Joppke 2004: 252).

Joppke admits that these policies rest on assumptions about the compatibility of certain groups and the liberal state. Thus, the inclusion of pictures of nude women and same-sex couples in the Dutch government’s now infamous information DVD for ‘integration abroad’ only makes sense if one assumes that it targeted a ‘Muslim audience for whom such footage is known to be an affront’ (2007: 15). Similarly, Baden-Württemberg’s guidelines for examining naturalisation applicants take for
granted ‘a binary opposition between liberal democracy and a certain idea of Islam, as prescribing or condoning arranged marriage, patriarchy, homophobia, veiling and terrorism’ (2007: 15). Thus Joppke draws a useful connection between the new civic integrationism and older strains of liberalism, which were mired in a colonialist worldview and relied on illiberal means to coax groups up to a level of ‘maturity’ needed to engage in liberal ways of life (Joppke 2007: 16). In both cases, putatively illiberal forms of life are deemed incompatible with and inferior to liberalism. This tacit hierarchy justifies taking aggressive measures to exclude or integrate illiberal immigrants.

More recently, Joppke (2010) has elaborated his approach to distinguishing liberal and illiberal forms of civic integrationism. Policies are illiberal when they seek to police individuals’ inner dispositions, rather than simply regulating their outward conduct. Hence, while the Dutch information DVD may be distasteful, it is arguably liberal, in that it presents prospective immigrants with information on behaviour they are likely to confront after arriving in the Netherlands. Conversely, Baden-Württemberg’s interview guidelines stray into illiberalism by delving into individuals’ personal beliefs—beliefs which ought to be guarded by the right to freedom of conscience (Joppke 2010: 142). This interest in shaping souls, and not just regulating conduct, strikes Joppke as an authoritarian overreach on the part of liberal states that see liberalism as the core element of a shared civic identity.

**Tebble: Identity Liberalism**

Like Joppke, Adam Tebble understands liberal states’ conduct in the area of integration policy as manifestations of a distinctive mode of identity formation. According to Tebble, civic integrationist policies are informed by a particular ideological strain, which he labels ‘identity liberalism’. Like more conservative forms of nationalism, identity liberalism upholds the rights of national communities to maintain their unique ways of life. However, it differs from conservative nationalism in that it sees the nation’s constitutive values as liberal, progressive and revisable, rather than as traditionalist, hierarchical and static. Identity liberalism thus aims to uphold the national identity of distinctively liberal polities; its project is the defence of liberal principles and their corresponding ways of life, rather than an ethnically derived ‘people’. The pursuit of this nationalist project may require coercively restricting the range of dialogue over values and procedures that are deemed to be constitutive of a liberal national identity; imposing rigorous assimilation policies to ensure that groups are capable of successfully functioning in a liberal society; and denying the admission of illiberal immigrant groups (Tebble 2006: 474). While liberal nations are capable of accommodating new demands, Tebble maintains that their capacity for change is limited to the extent that changes must not threaten the maintenance of their core liberal identities. Liberalism thus informs a particular mode of liberal-democratic regime: one in which certain core values, including
individuality and pluralism, are constitutive and effectively beyond debate and revision.

Identity liberals therefore reject strong forms of multiculturalism precisely because its proponents are too willing to compromise core liberal-democratic values in the name of upholding diversity. In protecting minority groups’ ‘rights to difference’, multiculturalists neglect the legitimate needs of liberal-democratic host societies, imperilling *heir* right to cultural maintenance. ‘For identity liberals... multiculturalism as a response to diversity does not represent the equalization of cultural expression but rather the death of the very culture that permitted multiculturalism in the first place’ (Tebble 2006: 481). Identity liberals thus challenge liberal multiculturalists to choose: ‘Either multiculturalism follows identity liberalism and accords [liberal] values normative priority over diversity—in which case it ceases to be significantly multicultural—or else it must accept that it is identity liberalism where they find their proper home’ (2006: 481). Liberal communities must avoid falling into the trap of neutrality—they must ‘know’ themselves and, having affirmed their identities, take steps to protect themselves.

Schmittian Liberalism?

Joppke and Tebble demonstrate that aggressive integrationism is rooted in a peculiar inflection of liberalism. Tebble also usefully notes that this type of liberalism shares nationalism’s commitment to the defence of the community’s core identity, but differs from traditional nationalism in that the values constituting this identity are liberal and progressive, rather than conservative and traditional. That is, identity liberalism is dedicated to defending the liberal state’s core principles against real and perceived threats from putatively illiberal and dangerous immigrants.

This conceptualisation of liberalism stands in stark contrast to the weak and excessively individualistic form famously condemned by the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, liberal constitutionalism’s commitments to neutrality and legal proceduralism provided useful cover for liberalism’s more basic privileging of individuals’ pursuit of private gain (Schmitt 1996: 70–1). A genuine politics, in Schmitt’s view, is rather based on the identity-constituting process of distinguishing between friends and enemies (1996: 26). It is in making such distinctions that a polity becomes aware of its distinctiveness. A politically conscious people is thus ‘homogenous’ in some sense—it is united around a common set of characteristics (which Schmitt leaves undefined) arrived at through engagement in ‘genuine’ politics (1996: 19).

The clarification of a people’s identity depends on its ability to distinguish between friends and enemies. For Schmitt ‘[t]he high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy’ (1996: 67). It is this perception of threat that catalyses a genuinely political reaction and, in so doing, affirms a group’s identity as a distinct people. Schmitt suggests that this
awareness results from our realisation that who we are and what we stand for as a people may be threatened by the actions of others. Thus engaging in the political clarifies our sense of ourselves as constituting a distinctive political community (Norris 2004: 262–3).

Christopher Hitchens’ recollection of how he felt in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks grants us some insight into this process:

On that day I shared the general register of feeling, from disgust to rage, but was also aware of something that would not quite disclose itself. It only became fully evident quite late that evening. And to my surprise (and pleasure), it was exhilaration. I am not particularly a war lover, and on the occasions when I have seen warfare as a traveling writer, I have tended to shudder. But here was a direct, unmistakable confrontation between everything I loved and everything I hated. On the one side, the ethics of the multicultural, the secular, the cosmopolitan. . . . On the other, the arid monochrome of dull and viscous theocratic fascism. I am prepared for this war to go on for a very long time. I will never become tired of waging it, because it is a fight over essentials (cited in Robin 2004: 158).

Liberalism’s failure to account for such situations, during which political identities are forged and routine procedures are set aside in order for sovereign power to be exercised on behalf of a distinct, self-aware people, reflects both its theoretical deficiencies and its political weakness. Liberal regimes’ general reluctance to recognise the threats posed by their enemies, and their insistence on maintaining rules and procedures even in times of crisis, leaves them vulnerable to harm. Liberalism, for Schmitt, is thus handcuffed by its excess ‘normativity’.

Schmitt suggests that liberal regimes might usefully respond to such existential threats if they are able to relax these self-imposed restraints and embrace the political. As William Scheuerman (1996: 310) has noted,

\[
\text{[P]olitical self-preservation rests on the possibility of relying on instruments incompatible with liberal-constitutionalism’s obsession with restraining and hemming in power. The very differentiation of a people from an ‘alien foe’ is inevitably supra-normative.}
\]

Whether consciously or not, a growing number of European liberals would agree that liberal regimes’ commitments to neutrality, rules and procedures must be tempered by the recognition that they are engaged in a struggle with dangerous political enemies intent on extinguishing their ways of life. Under such circumstances, treating liberalism’s adversaries as rational interlocutors in a polite dialogue would be a grave mistake. Rather, liberals must take forceful measures to ensure the preservation of their regimes:

If native Europeans and fundamentalist Muslims are to coexist in the West, the Muslims must temper their fundamentalism—period. The alternative is for Europeans to sacrifice the freedom, tolerance, and respect for individual mind and conscience on which Western civilization is founded (Bawer 2002: 346).
Schmittian liberals like Bawer view immigration and immigrant integration policies as indispensable weapons in this struggle. Potentially ‘dangerous’ immigrants must either be ‘screened out’ through immigration controls and integration and citizenship tests, or forcefully transformed into ideological ‘friends’ of their liberal-democratic host societies, through mandatory integration courses and other modes of compulsory civic education (Bawer 2002). At the same time, multiculturalists’ naive hopes in the persuasive power of reasoned dialogue must be rejected. Left unchallenged, the enemies of liberal democracy will stop at nothing short of the complete transformation of Western societies. In this ‘nightmare world’

the future will become the past...churches and cathedrals will be replaced by mosques and minarets, the call to prayer will echo from Paris to Rotterdam and London and the remnants of ‘Judeo-Christian’ Europe will have been reduced to small enclaves in a world of bearded Arabic-speakers and burka-clad women. The final triumph of Islamic barbarism will lead inexorably to the obliteration of secular society as homosexuals and adulterers are stoned to death in public and writers, liberal humanists and multiculturalists find themselves hoist by their politically correct petards and subjected to harsh repression (Carr 2007: 4).

To sum up, in the Schmittian liberal worldview, immigrant integration is not simply another public policy challenge among others; it is a crucial front in a larger war in which the very survival of ‘Western civilisation’ is at stake. In such a war, immigrants are either ‘with or against us’. It is therefore not surprising that there are striking parallels between the positions of Schmittian liberal supporters of civic integrationism and the advocates of an aggressive external ‘war on terror’ (Turner 2002). In both cases, the nature of the threat is such that rules and procedures regulating the use of force are deemed over-costly impediments to success in a battle that cannot be lost, lest the very society from which those rules and procedures emerged be destroyed. The preservation of liberal regimes in the face of such dire threats is deemed sufficient grounds for taking what may well be illiberal measures in the pursuit of the struggle.

Conclusion

What, then, are we to make of the policies inspired by the Schmittian liberal impulse? To begin with, I believe Fekete’s reservations about the justifiability of such policies are warranted. Simply claiming that a policy has been enacted to preserve liberal values does not render it unproblematic—doubly so if the framers of the legislation belong to extremist parties long dedicated to the pursuit of ethnic homogeneity and nationalist exclusion. Liberal rhetoric should not mask what are, at heart, exclusionary moves. Hence, we need to carefully scrutinise the source of policy proposals and, to the best of our ability, their likely effects.

Yet, as we have seen, support for civic integrationism is not limited to members of extreme-right-wing parties and movements; progressives have also stood in favour of
using punitive sanctions against groups whose commitment to liberalism they deem suspect; simply labelling such policies ‘racist’ risks overlooking a peculiar development within contemporary liberal practice. Debates over the role of the liberal state in pursuing integration policy lay bare a fundamental tension in the liberal tradition, driven by differences in its ‘Reformation’ and ‘Enlightenment’ strands. Whereas Reformation liberalism has its roots in the response to the European wars of religion and ‘takes as its central value the toleration of religious and cultural diversity[,] Enlightenment liberalism ... sees the distinctive task of liberalism as the promotion of a specific vision of the human good, namely, that of the autonomous, or rationally self-directing, individual’ (Crowder 2007: 123). While Reformation liberalism seeks to limit the state’s role in the private sphere, allowing individuals and groups to pursue their respective visions of the good life relatively unencumbered, Enlightenment liberalism aims at utilising state power in the name of encouraging the good of autonomy and protecting against threats to individual freedom raised by illiberal sub-groups.

The trends in immigration and immigrant integration policy that this paper has explored suggest that a growing number of European liberals, feminists and progressives have cast their lot on the side of the Enlightenment Project. Yet, as William Galston (1995) has noted, Enlightenment liberalism is a poor fit for societies characterised by pluralism because its emphasis on personal autonomy marginalises individuals and groups who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment Project’s aim of ‘liberating’ individuals from externally imposed authority through the exercise of reason (1995: 525–6). The decision to enlist state power on behalf of autonomy-based liberal projects carries the further risk of driving ‘many citizens of good will—indeed, many potential allies—into opposition’ (1995: 526). Galston thus argues in favour of the Reformation Project, ‘which takes deep diversity as its point of departure’ and counsels ‘a principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to impose one’s own view on others’ (1995: 527–8).

Galston usefully suggests that civic integrationism’s drawbacks are not related to its illiberality, but rather to its impracticality and likely ineffectiveness. In rejecting persuasion, argument and compromise and relying instead on decisiveness, force and sanctions, civic integrationists risk alienating the very groups they seek to integrate—turning potential friends into enemies. While there may be some psychological comfort and political advantage in forcing people to be free, the costs of such an approach may well be much too high, both in principled and especially practical terms.

Of course, this begs the question of where to ‘draw the line’ between tolerable beliefs and practices and those that cannot be accommodated within a liberal-democratic framework. While I cannot offer a satisfactory answer here, I would suggest that boundary-drawing of this kind is best pursued through serious and sustained dialogue between the authors and subjects of such decisions, along the lines suggested by scholars such as Seyla Benhabib (2004), Joseph Carens (2000), Tariq Modood (2007) and Bhikhu Parekh (1996). While there will at times be individuals
and groups who reject such dialogue and opt instead for violence, all states—including liberal democracies—have laws and policies in place to deal with such cases. Schmittian liberalism’s most glaring defect lies in conflating the pursuit of security with the objectives of immigrant integration policy, reducing a complex and dynamic process into an uncomplicated two-sided relationship pitting a civilised and superior ‘us’ against a caricatured ‘them’. Rather than settling for the simplifying logic of friends and enemies, policy-makers genuinely committed to developing an effective policy of integration would do better to engage the vast majority of immigrants who are committed to building a common home in a dignified manner, consistent with liberal-democratic values but also respectful of deeply held differences and open to dialogue and mutual accommodation. A strategy oriented along these lines is more likely to build the common bonds of belonging which any genuine integration policy must hold as its primary objective.

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Notes

[1] This reliance on punishment distinguishes civic integrationism from other, less aggressive, measures aimed at facilitating immigrants’ integration through mutual accommodation. Whereas the latter aim to use state power to assist and encourage immigrants to learn host states’ languages, prepare for citizenship acquisition etc., civic integrationist policies consciously employ the threat and application of punitive sanctions to compel compliance. And whereas approaches based on an ethic of accommodation recognise the two-sidedness of integration—which simultaneously transforms newcomers and host societies—the approaches noted above tend to see the process in linear terms, with the brunt of adjustment falling squarely onto immigrants’ shoulders.


Kymlicka and Banting (2006) identify eight policies as emblematic of liberal multiculturalism as it applies to immigrants: the constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula; the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; exemptions from dress codes, Sunday-closing legislation, etc; allowing dual citizenship; and the funding of ethnic-group organisations to support cultural activities.

The patterning of values onto religious cleavages—most importantly an alleged opposition between Christianity and Islam—has reinforced and deepened notions of incommensurability. Paradoxically, Christianity, Judaism and liberalism, long-standing antagonists in European political development, are often cast as natural allies in a struggle against ‘Islamic fascism’. Similarly, political coalitions between Christian, Jewish and Muslim interest groups, as, for example, in support of public funding for religious schools, fall out of sight.

Kymlicka’s view on this point has shifted markedly (2005).

References


