Recognition, Redistribution and Solidarity:
The Case of Multicultural Canada

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Standing Committee for the Social Sciences (SCSS)
Standing Committee for the Humanities (SCH)
Recognition, Redistribution and Solidarity:  
The Case of Multicultural Canada

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Abstract

This paper examines Canada’s post-World War Two evolution to illustrate how population diversity, support for the welfare state, and multiculturalism have been closely intertwined. It is argued that the Canadian case draws attention to three features that are of larger theoretical significance. First, the evidence shows that for minorities the quest for recognition is often fused with redistribution and that claims are not only group specific, but may reflect solidarity with others. Second, the Canadian case demonstrates that claims-making has also been shaped by the welfare state and understandings of citizenship and national identity. Finally, the Canadian case also suggests the value of re-framing recognition, solidarity and redistribution not as static end points, but rather as processes involving ongoing struggles in which the state is implicated.

You cannot ‘austere’ your way out of a crisis.”

Thomas Mulcair,  
Federal New Democrat Leader of the Official Opposition, Canada  
(Cited in Ruf, 2013)

As suggested in the response of Canada’s official opposition to the March 2013 budget of the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, austerity measures are controversial (Ruf, 2013). Indeed, in Canada, as in countries of the Eurozone and around the globe, austerity policies have raised anew very basic questions about the relationship between taxation, spending and borrowing. Like neo-liberal policy prescriptions of the 1990s, what British Prime Minister David Cameron has dubbed the “new age of austerity” (Summers, 2009) may therefore be seen to profoundly challenge the policies and understandings underpinning the post-World War Two Keynesian welfare state. It has been in this context of a challenge to the Keynesian consensus that the implications of population diversity for the welfare state have attracted ever-growing partisan as well as scholarly attention over the course of the twenty-first century (Abu-Laban, 2009; Salter, 2004; Van Parijs, 2004; Betz, 2002; Wolfe and Klausen, 2000). Stated simply, the literature addressing these debates variously seeks to uncover whether immigrants contribute to (or take from) the welfare state, and/or whether policies like multiculturalism or demographic heterogeneity – particularly along lines of race and ethnicity – weaken the solidarity necessary to support generous welfare spending (Abu-Laban, 2009). The very existence of a debate over the implications of immigration, diversity and/or multiculturalism for continued support for the
The welfare state is especially notable for dramatically underscoring how potentially easy it is to blame immigrants and minorities (either explicitly or implicitly) for social insecurity (Abu-Laban, 2009).

Weighing into the larger international debate, the important comparative empirical work of Keith Banting and colleagues suggests there is little systematic evidence of the erosion of the welfare state due to the existence of a range of policies which might be labeled “multicultural” (multiculturalism, dual citizenship, affirmative action etc.) (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004; 2006). More specifically for Canada there is no evidence that immigration, ethnic diversity and multiculturalism weakens the welfare state (Banting, 2005; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). At the same time, in the Canadian case it appears a “highly multicultural form of nationalism (or, if you prefer, a highly national form of multiculturalism) helps mitigate the toxic effects that anti-immigrant sentiments might otherwise have for the welfare state” (Johnston et.al, 2010: 369). When combined with the fact that much evidence supports the fact that immigrants contribute to the Canadian economy and the welfare state (Abu-Laban, 2009; Li, 2003) the case of Canada is particularly interesting from a comparative angle, not least because the reality of “complex diversity” is one that has a deep resonance in countries of North America, and one could go as far as to say a foundational relevance. This is because Canada, the United States and Mexico were formed as settler colonies with pre-existing indigenous communities. An enduring reminder of their settler-colonial foundation is that until now, many indigenous people refer to all of North America as Turtle Island – just as they did traditionally before first contact with Europeans.

This paper examines the Canada component of Turtle Island, seeking to shed further empirical light on how support for the welfare state/economic solidarity, population diversity and support for multiculturalism/pluralism have been closely inter-related in its post-World War Two evolution. While all of these dimensions are in flux in an era of neo-liberalism, and more recently austerity, it is argued that the Canadian case has much to tell us theoretically about possible relationships between mobilization, claims making, recognition, as well as economic and other forms of solidarity and redistribution. In this way, the case of Canada is important for inductive theory building, a focus central to the comparative method.

In what follows, I forward three major claims based on historical and contemporary evidence. First by situating Canada as a settler colony I underscore the complexity of unequal social power relations, national identity, and the corresponding complexity of claims, especially of less powerful groups. In particular, the claims of less powerful groups typically combine recognition and redistribution. That is to say, for minorities the quest for recognition is not traded with redistribution, but rather it is fused. Relatedly, these claims are not only group specific, but may also reflect economic/social and other forms of solidarity for other collectivities, and for all citizens.

Second, I will address the responses of the Canadian state to major claims of minority groups since the 1960s to highlight how these responses have been shaped by the consolidation and evolution of the welfare state, as well as the evolution and understanding of citizenship and national identity. Since 2006, under the leadership of the Conservatives of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, there has been the emergence of a patriotic neo-liberal citizenship where a historical narrative of military victories and Canada’s colonial ties with Britain have assumed a renewed place of symbolic stature. I suggest this form of citizenship poses distinct challenges to how groups advance claims for social justice especially given deepening racialized and feminized forms of precarity and inequality.

Finally, based on the preceding discussion, I will posit the theoretical value of reframing recognition, solidarity and redistribution, as processes involving ongoing struggles in which the state is implicated, rather than as end points.
I. Canada’s Settler Colonial Foundation and the Fusion of Recognition/Redistribution in Claims

Settler colonies, as Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis (1995) have argued are places where social relations defined by race, ethnicity, gender and class can take on highly variegated complicated forms because of pre-existing indigenous communities, and repeated waves of immigration. This is certainly the case in Canada. While most countries of the world are diverse, contemporary Canada is marked by a number of points of differentiation not necessarily seen in the same combination in other polities. These include the division between an indigenous population and a settler population; the division between European groups (French and British origin or French speakers and English speakers); a racialized division between “white” and “non-white;” as well as a division between immigrants and native-born. Combined, this means that Canada is not only a “country of immigration” but also contains “stateless nations” in its borders (hence the contemporary attention to indigenous “First Nations,” or the “Québécois” in the predominantly French-speaking province of Québec) (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban, 2008).

Additionally, this has meant that a range of social movements – including the labour movement and the women’s movement – have been confronted with and shaped by these divisions. For example during attempts at constitutional reform in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, the organization representing Quebec women (Fédération des femmes du Québec) split from the self-defined national Canadian body representing all Canadian women (the National Action Committee on the Status of Women) because of disagreements relating to constitutional change. Additionally, the women’s movement in many ways has been at the forefront of attempting to grapple with difference (based on race, ethnicity, language, class etc.). The advance of a feminist anti-racism was symbolized when the first woman of color, Sunera Thobani, served as President of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women between 1993-1996 (see also Dobrowolsky, 2000).

Because of their internal heterogeneity, as Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis also note, national myths in settler colonies do not, in fact cannot, rely on memories of common origin as they might in other polities. Instead they typically invoke a common destiny (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995). To take a known example, we see this looking towards a common destiny in the enduring metaphor of the United States as a “melting pot.” This metaphor was popularized as a result of British playwright Israel Zangwill’s play “The Melting Pot” which premiered in 1908 in a period of American history in which there was a lot of anxiety about the so-called “new immigrants” from southern and eastern Europe (Abu-Laban and Lamont, 1997). Notably, the play drew very mixed reviews which was indicative of the anxiety surrounding the new immigration (Abu-Laban and Lamont, 1997).

In Canada, the metaphor of choice, still in wide circulation today, has been that of “the mosaic.” Notably, the idea of the Canadian mosaic had popular purchase well before official or state multiculturalism was enacted by the Canadian federal state in 1971. The mosaic metaphor gained prominence and circulation through the work of John Murray Gibbon (1875-1952), when he served as the European Advertising Agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). Gibbon began his work at CPR in 1913, which was also a period in which Canada was taking in large numbers of “new immigrants” from southern and eastern Europe. The CPR was, of course, critical in transporting immigrants to “settle” the area of western Canada.

Under Gibbon, amongst other things, the CPR sponsored folk festivals in the Canadian prairies which featured songs and handicrafts from European groups composed of what he termed “old-timers” (that is British and French origin Canadians) who started the proceedings, as well as a range of “racial groups” from diverse countries of Europe who joined later (Henderson, 2005). It was typical for a Gibbon pageant to end with the various “races” coming together to sing “O Canada” and “God Save the King.” Obviously, and not to put too fine a point on it, these were sung in English (Henderson, 2005). In other words, the nature and ordering of presentations, as well as the culminating anthems, left little doubt...
that those that were white, and British origin, and English speaking were and would remain hegemonic.

In 1938 John Murray Gibbon wrote the book *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation*. Graphically in the title is the idea of the nation in process – in being willfully made and in becoming – which is so characteristic of settler-colonies. Gibbon also used the idea of the mosaic to express what he saw as a point of positive differentiation with the American melting pot, so the mosaic (not unlike Canada’s contemporary policy of multiculturalism) served to reinforce national identity and even pride.

Gibbon’s “mosaic” was focused exclusively on European groups, and therefore little reference was ever made to indigenous peoples (who also were largely written off the landscape of the western Canadian pageants just as they were literally off the land). Likewise, in Gibbon’s mosaic no reference is ever made to African-Canadians or Asian-Canadians (Henderson: 165).

By the 1960s, the mosaic idea found its way into scholarly studies of social stratification in Canada. In particular, the classic 1965 book of sociologist John Porter entitled *The Vertical Mosaic* illustrated how ethnicity and social class overlapped in Canada. Porter’s work showed that those of British origin had higher incomes, and higher levels of education, and were over-represented in decision-making spheres in comparison to those of French origin, southern and eastern Europeans and particularly indigenous people. Incoming immigrant groups assumed a kind of “entrance status” at or near the bottom of the pecking order (Porter, 1965).

On the ground, the period of the 1960s was to mark a major transition with the rise of new social movements. Important movements that formed, or resurfaced, in the 1960s drew inspiration from the human rights revolution and decolonization movements in the developing world, to essentially challenge the vertical mosaic and pressures for Anglo-conformity (that is for the dominant group to be the norm against which all others are to conform). As a result, there were different types of assertions for what might be termed decolonization.

The first decolonizing impulse would be a general assertion of Canadian independence from Britain through for example the adoption of a national flag of Canada in 1965 in place of variants containing the Union Jack, or eventually constitutional changes in 1982 which allowed for the constitution to be amended without approval from Britain (Indeed prior to 1982, Canada’s constitution was even called the *British North America Act*).

A second decolonizing effort came from francophones who resisted what they experienced as colonial domination – economically, politically and linguistically – by British-origin English speakers. French Quebecers in particular found inspiration in the 1962 provincial slogan “maître chez nous” (Masters in our Own House) used by Premier Jean Lesage. The philosophy behind this slogan marked a period in which greater provincial powers were sought and used to create a Ministry of Education, reform health care, nationalize hydro-electricity, create a Quebec Pension Plan and seek constitutional recognition and a veto power on amendments (these constitutional ambitions never came to pass, accounting for why Quebec still has not formally signed on to constitutional changes introduced in 1982). However, the general point that needs to be taken from this overview is that it would be difficult to disentangle concerns with recognition from concerns with redistribution in the case of the Québécois, or expressions of economic solidarity. In fact, the very development of the Quebec welfare state itself may be seen as an expression of identity. The relevance of provincial social programmes for minority national expression may reinforce other aspects of (sub)state national expression1 as well as the relatively greater sup-

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1 For example, it is interesting to note that the sovereignist Parti Québécois government removed the Canadian flag from the Quebec National Assembly when being sworn into power in September 2012, and incoming Premier Pauline Marois had it removed from the office of Premier in favour of having just the Quebec flag (Séguin, 2012).
port Quebecers give to provincial social spending compared to others in Canada, including in areas like early childhood education and care (Adkin and Abu-Laban, 2008).

A third form of decolonization emerged from indigenous (Aboriginal or First nations) groups. Indigenous people in Canada consistently have been and remain amongst the worst off on socioeconomic indicators and many will very explicitly say the contemporary Canadian state is a colonial state (Alfred, 2005). Since the 1960s and 1970s indigenous people have sought an end to assimilative policies, as well as land claims and forms of self-government. Glen Coulthard (forthcoming) argues that identity claims for recognition by indigenous peoples are in fact always connected with demands for a more equitable distribution of land, political power and economic resources. As such, he critiques the left position inspired by Nancy Fraser’s work that posits recognition coming at the expense of redistribution (see, e.g., Fraser, 2000). Coulthard argues this position is actually “misguided when applied to settler-colonial contexts.” Coulthard also makes the point that there is far greater transformative potential (in the terms articulated by Nancy Fraser) when indigenous groups make claims for self-determination (rather than recognition) and in those claims that are informed by the land “as a system of reciprocal relations and obligations” rather than treating the land as a material resource to be exploited (Coulthard, forthcoming).

In Canada there are distinctive legal and constitutional bases for the claims of indigenous peoples and francophones in and outside Quebec. In contrast, what is sometimes referred to as “the third force” (that is non-British, non-French and non-Aboriginal groups) did not have this. But they too reacted and mobilized against Anglo-conformity in the context of the political opportunities afforded. Thus, in 1963, when the federal government formed Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in response to renewed nationalism in Quebec, “the third force” challenged the depiction of Canada as comprised of only two cultures (English and French). In addressing the findings of this commission, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau announced a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual (English and French) framework in 1971.

Although in its first decade of existence multiculturalism policy gave support to folkloric elements of culture (not unlike the pageants sponsored by CPR and Gibbon in the 1930s) multiculturalism provided a framework to pursue other demands for state resources and recognition. By the early 1980s, in response to demands from growing numbers of racialized minorities, the policy shifted to deal with anti-racism, and in addition provided a basis to successfully pursue legislated affirmative measures (employment equity) by 1986 (Stasiulis, 1988: 90-92). As a result of minority mobilization, multiculturalism was also constitutionally entrenched in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

It is instructive to look closely at the claims of ethnic minorities in pushing for the constitutional recognition of multiculturalism in the Charter, as well as subsequent proposed constitutional amendments in the 1980s and 1990s. Although some media and academic accounts posit that those focusing on multiculturalism were narrow and focused on their “particular” group rather than all Canadian citizens, this understanding is not substantiated by a close reading of the actual claims that were forwarded (Abu-Laban and Nieguth, 2000). These actual claims reveal that in pursuing constitutional recognition of multiculturalism minorities did so from the perspective of also asserting the need to recognize collectivities advancing justice and recognition claims outside of the framework of multiculturalism. Thus, they also stressed the need to support the claims of Aboriginal people, francophones in and outside Quebec, women, and persons with disabilities (Abu-Laban and Nieguth, 2000). Although they were not successful, minorities also pursued constitutional recognition of affordable (higher) education and social programmes designed for all Canadian citizens such as universal health care and old age security (Abu-Laban and Nieguth, 2000).

Put differently, the history of the multicultural movement, and the advance of claims, was done through solidarity – including both political solidarity for other disempowered groups seeking constitutional recognition, and also economic solidarity underpin-
ning the programmes associated with the social dimensions of Canadian citizenship. More broadly, Matt James in his book *Misrecognized Materialists* shows how women, workers and ethnic minorities who made identity claims for recognition in the context of constitutional debates in Canada between the 1930s and the 1990s were often primarily concerned with economic security and redistribution (James, 2006). These claims illustrate the manner in which the three elements of recognition, forms of solidarity and redistribution are inter-related in claims-making.

To summarize, unequal social relations have characterized Canada’s foundation and evolution. The evidence across many social groups in Canada over several decades suggests that they were and are concerned with economic inequality, that recognition claims are often redistributive claims and express solidarity, and that solidarity itself takes economic and non-economic dimensions. In this regard, it is also helpful to recognize how the Canadian (welfare) state also plays a role in these dynamics, and the shifting terrain of what social citizenship means.

II. The Consolidation and Evolution of the Canadian Welfare State and the Rise of Patriotic Neo-liberal Citizenship

With the development of the welfare state the federal Canadian state has not only been involved in managing relationships between state, market, family (as well as voluntary sector), but it has also been involved in what Raymond Breton calls the management of the symbolic order (Breton, 1984: 127). More specifically, responses to the claims of social movements coming out of the 1960s paired the Keynesian welfare state with a culturally pluralist ethos of citizenship and national identity (Abu-Laban, 2009: 149).

The consolidation of programs associated with the Canadian welfare state came in the late 1960s – that is later than in many European countries (Harder, 2003) and in the terms of Esping-Andersen (1990) the Canadian welfare state might be seen as liberal due to the relatively weaker emphasis on universal programs and heavier emphasis on needs and means-tested programs in comparison with Northern European countries. However, by the late 1960s Canada’s welfare state came to include Unemployment Insurance, the Family Allowance, the Medical Care Act 1966, the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan, and not least the Canada Assistance Plan, which facilitated joint, equivalent, and uncapped federal and provincial funding of programs.

Notably however, the post-war Canadian welfare state was not only about these programs, but also symbolized that there was a role for the state as a champion of social justice (Jenson 1997, 634) and in responding to the desire of different collectivities to see themselves in public institutions (Breton, 1984).

It is difficult to think of a more symbolic policy than multiculturalism. It has never, in comparative terms with other areas of cultural spending, received much funding. It was never designed to ameliorate class or gender-based inequalities. Moreover, it encouraged all kinds of platitudes – especially in election campaigns. However, multiculturalism has served as an important and inclusionary discourse, as well as providing a framework for the advancement of claims by ethnic minorities (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992). In other words, it provided a means for more Canadians to see themselves in public institutions, and to make claims in relation to these institutions.

Claims-making was enhanced by federal spending. Thus, in addition to funding women’s and indigenous groups, from the 1970s new public policies like multiculturalism and official bilingualism entailed the funding of ethnic and linguistic minorities to better enable them to engage in the policy process, simultaneously legitimizing the recognition and claims of less powerful groups in the name of citizen equality (Breton 1986; Jenson and Phillips 1996).

However, by the 1990s the situation changed with key programmes that marked the consolidation of the welfare state dismantled (like Family Allowance and the Canada Assistance Plan). As recent academic literature attests, a spate of labels – lean, competitive,
liberal, neo-liberal, post-Keynesian, post-neo-liberal – have emerged to distinguish current state configurations from the post-war welfare state (Abu-Laban, 2009:150). The term “neo-liberal” arguably captures certain assumptions that have framed much of the public debate and the policy environment, both in Canada and internationally since the 1980s and 1990s (even if neo-liberalism might lack coherence due to crises of its own creation – see Brodie, 2012:13-14). These assumptions include a more limited role for the state and consequently an emphasis on cutting back social spending, a greater stress on individual self-sufficiency, and a belief that free markets are efficient allocators of goods and services (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 21).

Since the 1990s, neo-liberal policy rationales have transformed the nature of Canadian social citizenship. Moreover, neo-liberal policy changes also served to limit supports to, as well as the claims-making abilities of, disadvantaged groups. This is because of cuts to funding as well as new terms for funding. As Jenson and Phillips (1996) show, the remaking of social policy in the mid-1990s clearly also lent support to an ideological attack on groups such as women, racial minorities, and the poor, for these groups came to be depicted as “special interests” whose demands and issues contrasted with those of “ordinary Canadians.”

As a consequence, the equity agenda was dealt a severe blow, and the national presence of women’s groups and minority groups (amongst others) has been weakened (Abu-Laban, 2013). The disappearance of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women from the federal scene has consequences for minority women as well as men. This is because the women’s movement has been the forefront of articulating a politics of anti-racist feminism. Indeed, such a politics is especially needed in the post-September 11 period, where gender equality has been appropriated into clash of civilizations discourses including by the Harper Conservatives (Abu-Laban UR, 2013; Razack 2008).

Not least, neo-liberalism has gone hand in hand with a deepening feminization and racialization of poverty amongst Canadian citizens (Brodie, 2008; Galabuzi, 2011). This broader racialization of inequality may be seen to have been further aggravated by the increasing use of temporary migrant workers who are denied Canadian citizenship. In fact, since 2006 – the year the Harper Conservatives came to power – the number of temporary entrants to Canada has actually exceeded the number of those that are selected for permanent residence (Rajkumar et al., 2012: 484).

The growing diversity and array of programmes to facilitate temporary entry has led to a plethora of rules and practices governing issues relating to security, employment for spouses, as well as social services including settlement services suggesting that Canada produces inequality through policy (Rajkumar et al., 2012). This inequality is not only between citizens and non-citizens who reside in Canada, but amongst non-citizens who reside in Canada. This is where it becomes compelling to consider Diane Sainsbury’s call (2012) to attend to the welfare state in relation to immigrant rights and refugee rights. In the Canadian case, funding has been cut (for example cuts in 2012 for the healthcare of refugees which doctors say now is compromising the care and safety of pregnant women amongst others – see Ubelacker, 2012). Moreover, the multiple forms of precarity in relation to legal and social citizenship require new conceptual thinking (Goldring et al., 2009).

Not least, since 2006, under the Harper Conservatives, a patriotic citizenship has been superimposed over neo-liberal citizenship. What I call “patriotic neo-liberal citizenship” has all the features of neo-liberalism described, but has further entailed a qualitative

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1 One example of this might be found in the 2009 Conservative changes to the citizenship guide which introduced the language of “barbarism” and posited violence against women as the sole practice of cultural “Others,” by implicitly drawing on stereotypes about Muslims (see also Razack, 2008 on the construction of the barbaric Muslim male and oppressed Muslim female). This is contained in the following statement: “In Canada, men and women are equal under the law. Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, “honour killings,” female genital mutilation or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely punished under Canada’s criminal laws.” (Canada, 2012: 10).
shift in the symbolic order. Specifically, the hallmark features of patriotic citizenship have entailed a valorization of military history over social history in official national narratives; a valorization of military victory over peacekeeping; and a valorization of the crown and British ties to Canada over pluralism and multiculturalism. In the words of Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Canada is being rebranded as a “warrior nation” (2012).

Patriotic citizenship is illustrated in a new citizenship guide released in 2009 explicitly aimed not only at immigrants seeking Canadian citizenship but at the national memory of all Canadians; numerous statements by the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney as well as Prime Minister Stephen Harper; as well as new forms of public spending (such as the 28 million committed by the federal government to commemorate in 2012 the bicentennial of the War of 1812). (Abu-Laban, UR; Canada 2012; McKay and Swift, 2012).

It is also illustrated in lexicon – hence the move in August 2011 of reinstating the word “royal” into the titles given to branches of the Canadian military, transforming the “Air Command” to “Royal Canadian Air Force,” and the “Maritime Command” to the “Royal Canadian Navy.” Military historian Jack Granatstein, who headed the Canadian War Museum between 1998-2001, has called the re-naming “abject colonialism” arguing it was “odd in the 21st century to be reverting to royal titles for the navy and air force” (quoted in Yelaja, 2011). However, it is actually not “odd” when placed as a plank in the attempted remaking of Canadian citizenship and national memory from pluralist to patriotic, with emphasis on Canada’s ties to Britain. It also suggests the politically controversial agreement worked out between Canada and the UK in September 2012 to share some embassies and consulates abroad is not only about cutting costs, but symbolic; this may account for some of the controversy this move generated in Canada (Radio Canada, 2012).

It is true that the Harper Conservatives have gone further than any other government previously in entertaining claims for historic redress, and have in some instances issued apologies (for example for residential schools in the case of Aboriginal people, and the headtax which historically limited the migration of spouses and family members of Chinese-Canadians). A new 2008 programme under the rubric of multiculturalism (the Community Historical Recognition Programme) has allowed for educational/commemorative projects for groups recognized to have been affected by wartime measures or immigration restrictions. While this may be seen as positive, it should not preclude attention being given to the larger dynamics of this programme. As Matt James argues, the overall approach can be critiqued as one of what he aptly dubs “neo-liberal heritage redress” (James, forthcoming). For James, neo-liberal heritage redress joins forces with neo-liberal multiculturalism in placing restrictive conditions on both the possibility and use of state funding, allowing the government to pick select groups that will be rewarded, as well as severely limiting contemporary claims for social justice, equity and anti-racism (James, forthcoming). It could therefore be critiqued for failing to deal with contemporary inequities stemming from race, gender, class and citizenship status.

More to the point, under the Harper Conservatives the larger symbolic order is not being set by a focus on the history of social groups, but rather by military history, militarized patriotism and Canada’s colonial ties with Britain. In short, what we are witnessing under the Harper Conservatives is an attempted return to the status quo ante of the 1930s Gibbon era of the Canadian mosaic, when there was no doubt about who really held power. The patriotic shift in the symbolic order may also carry implications for the welfare state, in so far as it combines a retrenchment of a “multicultural form of nationalism” (Johnston et al., 2010: 369) along with a retrenchment of social citizenship.

To recap this section, the consolidation and early development of the Canadian welfare state supported the advancement of a culturally pluralist nation and citizenship. With the neo-liberal turn, this ethos has been strained, especially as disadvantaged groups have a weakened national presence, and socioeconomic inequalities have been exacerbated.
The turn towards neo-liberal patriotic citizenship provides reduced supports and discursive space for minorities to advance claims to deal with contemporary inequities.

III. Towards Theorizing Recognition, Redistribution and Solidarity as Processes

By way of conclusion it can be asked what might be gleaned from the Canadian case in broader theoretical terms? First, the Canadian case suggests that the claims of disadvantaged groups typically fuse recognition and redistribution. Second, and flowing from this, it shows that the claims of minority collectivities can reflect political solidarity with other minoritized groups, as well as the economic solidarity associated with the welfare state. This suggests the need for a broader conception of solidarity that links both economic and non-economic dimensions. Third, the Canadian case highlights that the welfare state has taken different forms which may advance or limit claims-making, and that nation-state symbolism may take different forms (from culturally pluralist to militarized patriotic).

In light of these three points, I would forward that there is theoretical value in re-framing recognition, redistribution and solidarity as ongoing processes involving both social and state actors, rather than as being static.

Aboriginal artist Bill Reid’s sculpture “The Spirit of Haida Gwaii” depicts a boat crammed with human and non-human figures drawn from the mythology of the Haida people. Until it was replaced in 2012 by an image commemorating the World War One Battle of Vimy Ridge, the Spirit of Haida Gwaii image was also on the Canadian twenty dollar bill. The Canadian Museum of Civilization describes the sculpture as follows:

The sculpture encompasses mythical creatures, animals, men and women, who together represent not just a single culture but the entire family of living beings. The canoe is filled to overflowing with creatures who bite and claw one another as they doggedly paddle along.” (Canadian Museum of Civilization, n.d.)

Picking up on artist Bill Reid’s observation that “the boat moves on, forever anchored in the same place,” (Canadian Museum of Civilization, n.d.) Canadian philosopher Jocelyn MacClure draws parallels with the politics of recognition (2003). For MacClure there is no end point to recognition, not least because there is always internal heterogeneity within groups (the issue of “minorities within minorities” is also a concern long raised by feminist and other theorists see e.g., Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005). In other words, because there are asymmetrical power relations both between and within groups, conversations and claims will continue (2003: 3-4). MacClure helpfully posits that we need a shift in language from “recognition,” to “struggling for recognition.” This, he suggests, re-frames our thinking away from some kind of “end-state of recognition” and invites us to instead consider struggles for recognition as part of democratic politics, and re-imagining justice (2003: 4).

A similar point could also be made about redistribution, and economic and non-economic forms of solidarity. Beginning with T.H. Marshall (1965) in his classic work on the development of the British citizenship, the social citizenship afforded by the welfare state was presented in evolutionary terms. In essence, redistribution was presented as an end point. Arguably the presentation of an end-state of redistribution may also be seen in other common shorthands, like “post war settlement” – as if everything was “settled” when we know that at least since the 1980s there has been a lot of debate as well as unsettling of the Keynesian welfare state. Contemporary debates over the appropriateness of austerity measures in the advanced economies today (Krugman, 2012), not to mention the politics on the streets of Greece, Cyprus and elsewhere in 2012 and 2013, are suggestive that there are ongoing struggles for redistribution and social/political/economic solidarity.

Struggles for redistribution and solidarity are also evident in Canada. On the one hand, there are recent opinion surveys which suggest many Canadians may perceive the economic situation positively. For example, a Bank of Montreal Labour Day survey in 2012 found nearly 2/3 (64%) felt they had job security (Freeman, 2012). As well, Canada’s Conservative finance minister has routinely stressed Canada’s economic growth, and that its
GDP recovery has been the best of the G7 (Robinson and O’Kane, 2012). Headlines such as “Canada’s Economy Outperforming U.S.” are also in abundance (CBCNews, 2012). On the other hand, the lived experience of many Canadians and the reality of globalization would suggest Canada is not some sheltered oasis. As Janine Brodie noted in 2012:

… in an increasingly complex and interdependent global economy, Canada is neither protected nor immune from trouble. In fact, Canada has many of the precarious markers of this era. Income inequality is growing more quickly here than in the US and surpasses levels set in the 1920s; personal debt has never been higher; savings have never been lower; and un- and under-employment are stubbornly high, especially in former manufacturing hubs and among the young, the racialized, and newcomers. This says nothing about those who, at the stroke of a government or corporate pen, find themselves without a paycheck (Brodie, 2012: 4).

The reverberating impact of the Occupy Wall Street Movement across Canadian cities in 2011, as well as the many months long student strike in Quebec over tuition in 2012, are indicative of support for democracy, for social policies, and for social and economic solidarity (Bherer and Dufour, 2012; Smith 2012). They are also suggestive of the ongoing challenge to neo-liberal globalization and capitalism since the 2008 financial crisis.

In the final analysis the Canadian case is one that draws attention to how diversity has coincided with support for the welfare state (Banting, 2005; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Johnston et al., 2010). The Canadian case also shows that claims for recognition, redistribution and solidarity are part and parcel of the expression of diversity politics. This may be seen to be a feature of the “complex diversity” that characterizes Canadian liberal democracy today, and was set in place in its settler-colonial foundation. In light of the fact that recognition, redistribution and solidarity may be seen as ongoing processes in democratic politics, the neo-liberal patriotic citizenship being advanced by the Harper Conservatives is subject to contestation. Indeed, already social historians have explicitly countered the military and Empire narrative of the Harper Conservatives, by stressing the importance of social movement politics in shaping the nature and rights associated with Canadian citizenship (Jones and Perry, 2012).

It is evident that Canadian social groups and movements face challenges in advancing a social justice agenda in an era of patriotic neo-liberal citizenship. This is also a reminder that it is important to consider how the (welfare) state impacts minorities, citizens and non-citizens, by enabling or constraining citizenship, rights and claims (see also Sainsbury, 2012). Given the salience of the ongoing debate over diversity and the welfare state, especially in European politics, this is a relevant question to be asking in comparative research. This is all the more so, given that there is little consensus about the appropriateness of austerity measures, even if such measures may be defining a new age.

References


